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Introduction
When American women obtained the vote in 1920, 
many people expected that a women’s voting bloc 
would alter the shape of politics in the future.  However, 
for the next 60 years, women voted similarly to their 
male relatives. In 1980, a gender gap in voting did 
emerge when the Republican presidential candidate, 
Ronald Reagan, received 54% of men’s votes and only 
46% of women’s (Abzug & Kelber 1984).  Women are 
now significantly more likely to vote for Democratic 
candidates than are men.  In the last five presidential 
elections, a majority of women voted for the Democratic 
presidential candidate, while a majority of men voted 
for the Republican candidate.  In the 2016 election, 54 
percent of women voted for Clinton, while 52 percent of 
men voted for Trump (e.g., Bump 2018).
Polls have shown that men and women tend to have 
different views of government’s roles. For example, over 
the years, men have proven to be substantially more 
supportive of U. S. government war efforts than women. 
In contrast, women have been more supportive of 
government programs that provide public services and, 
particularly, safety nets for those in trouble than have 
men (e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016: 256-7.)  
The question that drives our analysis in this paper 
is why the gender gap in political preference emerged 
in the 1980s and why it persists today.  Our review of 
the relevant literature indicates that two major large-
scale changes have been identified, both of which have 
expanded women’s opportunities and responsibilities. 
These changes are 1) the enormous increase, since 
1970, in women’s labor-force participation and 2) the 
equally enormous increase in women living outside of 
marriage.  We also theorize that the decline of unions 
and the greater likelihood of both women and men 
living outside of marriage have played a role, especially 
in distancing of men from the Democratic Party.  We 
test the relative contribution of each of these changes to 
the gender gap in political preference using a data set not 
commonly analyzed in examining that gap.  The General 
Social Survey (GSS) data we use allows us to examine 
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changes in the gender gap in political affiliation at more 
frequent intervals than does presidential election data.
Labor Force Participation
The first explanation for the gender gap in voting 
involves women’s labor force participation.  Since the 
1970s, there has been a tremendous increase in female 
participation in the workforce, an increase that we 
capture, in one way, in Figure 1.  The percentage of 
women working full time almost doubled (from 25% to 
46.4%) between 1972 and 1994 and has remained nearly 
at this level ever since.  We prefer to use the percentage 
of women working full time in this paper, over the more 
conventional measure of the percentage of women in 
the labor force, since it is a truer indicator, in our view, 
of women’s financial independence from men. (See 
Figure 1 in Appendix A.)
Women’s labor force participation, the theory goes, 
affects their involvement in politics in several ways. 
One has to do with reference groups.  At work, women 
are exposed to other women’s views about politics. It 
is typical for women to talk about political campaigns, 
candidates, and government policies (Manza & Brooks 
1998). Hearing other women’s beliefs about politics is 
likely to influence the way women think about these 
ideas. When women don’t work, they do not have as 
much opportunity to talk about topics like politics 
with other women because their domain is more likely 
to be confined to their homes. As a result, they are 
more likely to subscribe to the political views of their 
marital (or other) partner.  Participation in the labor 
force serves as a source of political socialization and 
expands the knowledge of its occupants. For women, 
this is especially likely to lead to their greater political 
involvement.
In addition, employment introduces women to a 
new set of roles. Holding a job opens questions about 
appropriate gender roles, questions that some women 
will not have previously faced. It reinforces a sense of 
women’s ability. Employment inspires more feminist-
centered goals and increases women’s desire for political 
activism (Manza & Brooks 1998). This, in turn, may 
lead women to be more liberal and Democratic. 
Finally, working for pay may give women a sense of 
financial independence because they do not have to 
rely on their partners for money.   In many instances, 
however, women are paid less than men and the types 
of careers they pursue are limited to what are deemed 
“women’s work.” This, in turn, increases their awareness 
of and support for governmental “safety net” programs 
(Inglehart & Norris 2000) like Section 8, Medicare, 
school breakfast and lunch programs, and more (Welch 
& Hibbing 1992). For these several reasons, we speculate 
that women’s participation in the workforce will be 
associated with increases in the political gender gap.   
Women’s Experience of Marital Decline
Other explanations for the gender gap in political 
preference-- its emergence and its longevity have 
focused on the rise of divorce rates, delayed marriage 
and unmarried motherhood.  These factors have left 
many women as single parents fending alone to care 
for their children and family members who are elderly, 
sick, or disabled.  Data on the likelihood that women 
and men live in marital relationships are shown in 
Figure 2 (in Appendix A.)   Figure 2 presents changes 
over time in the percentage of General Social Survey 
respondents who reported being married by survey 
year.  Specifically, in 1974, 74.8% of women reported 
being married, while only 48.7% of them did so in 2016.
(See Figure 2 in Appendix A.)
Women’s declining chances of being married, an 
effect of both increased divorce rates and later age at 
marriage (Stritof 2019), has increased their chances 
of having a Democratic affiliation for several reasons. 
Perhaps most important, marriage creates partnerships 
in which women perceive their self-interests being 
linked to men and, generally, in which they receive 
resource transfers from men “in exchange for access to 
children” (Edlund & Pande 2002:923).  Married couples 
are also more likely to have a greater financial security 
than single people.  Financial stability translates into 
being more likely to lean Republican (Wilson & Lusztig 
2004:980).  
Non-marriage, on the other hand, can lead women 
to see their fate as linked to those of other women 
(Stout, Kretschmer & Ruppaner 2017).  In general, the 
Democratic Party, more so than the Republican Party, 
is viewed as supporting programs that advance those 
“linked fates.” The Democratic Party, for example, 
favors welfare programs and programs that help people 
through tough times. Low-income single women 
are apt to use such programs and lean towards the 
party that supports such programs (Edlund & Pande 
2002:925) and other single women are apt to see such 
programs as positive, too. The Democratic Party also 
supports other women’s issues, such as abortion/birth 
control issues, equal pay for men and women, and 
efforts to limit sexual assaults (the #MeToo Movement). 
Consequently, we hypothesize that, when women are 
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unmarried, the political gender gap between them and 
men will be larger.
De-Unionization
While the “labor force participation” and “women’s 
experience of marital decline” explanations of the gender 
gap in political affiliation speak to why women’s affiliation 
may have begun to be independent of men’s in the 1980s 
(and, perhaps, grown thereafter), these explanations do 
not really speak to why men’s political affiliation did not 
continue to parallel women’s political leanings. They 
imply that both greater labor force participation and 
lower marriage rates will have led women to hope for 
government policies that are supportive of individuals, 
and therefore lean Democratic.  But why would not 
men who experience lower marriage rates have become 
more Democratic, too?
There have been certain societal trends, other than 
the decline in marriage, which might have led men 
to vote Democratic.  Since the 1960s, the American 
industrial economy has thinned, thanks in part both 
to automation and to outsourcing. These factors have 
deprived less-educated men of many relatively high-paying 
manufacturing and construction jobs (e.g., Kenschaft 
& Clark 2016:41-47).  This de-industrialization, plus an 
accompanying growth of income and wealth inequality 
(e.g., Piketty & Saez 2003), might have led to a greater 
allegiance of less-educated men to the Democratic Party, 
the party traditionally less associated with the interests 
of big business and more likely to pursue programs that 
support the relatively powerless. 
But recognition of, and action on behalf of, economic 
and political interests requires organization.  And there 
is one notable modality for such organization that has 
suffered enormously since the 1950s: unions.  While 
33.2% of American workers were unionized in 1955, 
10.5% were unionized in 2018 (Bureau of Labor 2019 and 
Meyer, 2004).  As a consequence, the historic synergy 
between working class people and the Democratic 
Party, facilitated by union membership (e.g., McGarrity 
2001), has been challenged.  In fact, de-unionization 
has contributed to working-class (maybe particularly 
white working-class) disaffection from the established 
political system (Milkman, 2018), leading to generally 
lower voter turnout, perhaps especially among men 
(Kenschaft & Clark 2016:258).  Milkman (2018) argues 
that the resentment that feelings of powerlessness create 
has made working-class men especially receptive to 
populist entreaties on the part of politicians from the 
left or right.  This variable can help explain the election 
of Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, in 2016.  
There are several reasons to believe that de-
unionization may have led more men to become more 
Republican than women.  However, one does not really 
have to go any further than to recognize that more men 
than women have left unions since the 1970s. While 25% 
of men had unionized jobs in 1983, only about 12% did 
so in 2015.  The comparable figures for women—14% 
and 11%--indicate a much smaller decline (Center for 
Economic and Policy Research 2016). We speculate 
that loss of union ties, then, have made more men 
than women susceptible to a Republican affiliation that 
those ties might have hindered earlier.  In any case, we 
hypothesize that de-unionization will be associated 
with an increase in the political gender gap.
Men’s Experience of Marital Decline
The flip side of the divorce (and delayed marriage) 
revolution’s effect on women’s chances of affiliating with 
the Democratic Party is its likely effect on men’s chances 
of affiliating with the Republican Party.  If marriage is 
conceived of as exchanges of men’s economic resources 
for “access to children” (Edlund & Pande 2002:923), 
then a decline in marriage meant for many men 
they could retain those economic resources, making 
them wealthier and, hence, even more likely to side, 
politically, with the political party (Republican) most 
interested in protecting personal wealth.  Moreover, 
marriage tends to create a primary reference group 
in the spouse not only for women, but also for men. 
In fact, it is well known that men tend benefit more 
from marriage than women, in terms of health gains 
and other tangible indicators of their connection to a 
spouse (e.g., Harvard Health Publishing 2019)—this, 
largely because of their relationship to one significant 
other, a wife.  In the absence of a wife, however, men 
may become less concerned about the “linked fate” 
of all women, and therefore turn away from the party 
(Democratic) that evinces the greater support for 
women’s concerns.  In short, we expect that as men’s 
chances of being unmarried increased, the gender gap 
in political affiliation will have increased.
Methods
We were interested in how the political leanings, and 
not just the attitudes towards particular presidential 
candidates, of men and women changed over time, and 
particularly how they changed during the 1980s and 
later.  We aimed therefore to measure both the political 
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affiliation of women and men at relative short (one- and 
two-year) intervals and the aggregate political party 
affiliation of men and women in each of the five decades 
since 1970.
The General Social Survey (GSS) asks the question, 
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself 
as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what”? 
in each of 31 national surveys since 1972 (the last, 
as of this writing, in 2018).  The responses are coded 
into seven categories: strong Democrat; not strong 
Democrat; Independent but near Democrat; Independent; 
Independent but near Republican; not strong Republican; 
and strong Republican.  We combined the first three 
response options into the broad category “Democrat,” 
the last three into the broad category “Republican,” and 
retained the Independent category separately.  For the 
first part of our analysis, we showed how the difference 
between the percentage of females and males who 
claimed to be Democrats changed in individual surveys 
over time.  
We then used the GSS question, “Last week were you 
working full time, part time, going to school, keeping 
house, or what?” to measure how women’s and men’s 
work status has changed over the years since it was 
first asked in the 1972 GSS. The eight response options 
the GSS used for this variable are “working fulltime;” 
“working part time;” “temporarily not working;” 
“unemployed or laid off;” “retired;” “school;” “keeping 
house;” and “other.”  We recoded this variable into two 
broad response options: “working fulltime” and “not 
working fulltime.”  For the second part of the analysis, 
we showed how the percentages of females and males 
who were working fulltime changed in individual 
surveys over time.
The GSS also asks a question about marital status: 
“Are you currently -- married, widowed, divorced, 
separated, or have you never been married?”  We 
recoded this variable into two categories: “married” and 
“not married.”  The third part of our analysis involved 
showing how the percentage of females and males who 
were married varied over time.
In subsequent analyses, we examined differences in 
male and female political affiliation by decade and then 
used this greater number of aggregate cases to study the 
effects of women’s employment and marital status on 
those differences.  
In our analysis, we looked at the relative strength of 
association between the percentage of women “married” 
and “working fulltime,” on one hand, and our measure 
of the political gender gap (the percentage of women 
with a Democratic affiliation minus the percentage 
of men with such an affiliation) over the 31 periods. 
We then compared each of these associations with 
the associations between the percentage of American 
workers who were unionized (data from Bureau of 
Labor 2019 and Meyer 2004) and the percentage of men 
“married” and “working fulltime” and the gender gap. 
Finally, we used stepwise regression to sort out which of 
the independent variables had the greatest effect, over 
time, on changes in the gender gap.
Results
Figure 3 in Appendix A shows the trend for our 
measure of the gender gap in political preference: the 
percentage of women claiming they are Democrats 
minus the percentage of men who claim to be 
Democrats. Throughout the 1970s, men and women 
had a similar likelihood to claim Democratic affiliation, 
despite a small peak in 1973. However, in the 1980s 
women’s likelihood to claim being Democrats pulled 
ahead.  By 1989, the difference between women and 
men stood at 8.5%. 
In the 1990’s, the gap increased overall, although with 
a few spikes. The first spike was in 1991. We believe this 
spike is associated with the Gulf War which started in 
1990 and ended in 1991.  Surveys have shown that, 
typically, men are more likely to support war than 
women (e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016:255ff.) and, in 
general, that the Republican Party has been more likely 
to support war than the Democratic Party.  Another 
spike occurred in 1996, the year that the “Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act” was passed. President Clinton was pressured 
into signing this act by a Congress that was a majority 
Republican at the time, even though he had already 
vetoed two other pieces of legislation that threatened the 
safety net for poor families (Schafer 2017). We believe 
that the spike in women’s support for the Democratic 
Party is connected to the fact that women were sticking 
by the party that generally fought against these welfare 
reform programs. In 2010, Barack Obama signed the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare.” The ACA 
was aimed at helping families get the healthcare they 
needed at a lower cost.  This Democratic legislation was 
much more popular among women than men; hence, 
another spike in the political gender gap appeared in 
2010. (See Figure 3 in Appendix A.)
Using all the General Social Surveys between 1970 and 
1980 combined, Table 1 shows that, during the 1970s, 
there was very little difference in women and men’s 
political leanings.  During this decade, 62.8% of males 
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and 63.4% of females identified with the Democratic 
Party. The gamma relating political preference and 
gender was -.01, showing that females were not more 
likely than males to lean Democratic during the 1970’s. 
(See Table 1 in Appendix B.)
In Table 2 in Appendix B, we look at the 1980s, 1990s, 
2000s, and 2010s.  In the 80s, the relationship between 
gender and political leanings starts to grow. 53.4% of 
men reported leaning Democratic, while 58.5% of 
women did so. The relationship grows even stronger 
in 1990. Nearly 58% of females reported leaning 
Democratic, while only 48.2% of men did so. In the 
2000s and 2010s, the relationship had been established 
and remained steady, showing women are more likely to 
lean Democratic than men are in those decades as well. 
(See Table 2 in Appendix B.)
We expected that women who were unmarried and 
worked full time would be more likely to be Democrats 
than either married women who did not work full time 
or unmarried men who worked full time.  Table 3 in 
Appendix B looks at the combination effects of marriage 
and labor force participation on party affiliation by 
gender. The data in Table 3 show that males and females 
who are married and do not work full time have similar 
likelihoods of being Democrats in all decades under 
examination. Specifically, 62.6% of such males were 
Democrats in the 1970s, while 60.9% of such women 
were. Table 3 also shows a similar relationship as time 
progresses.  By the 2010s, for example, 49.8% of men 
who were married and did not work fulltime were 
Democrats, while 48.2% of such women were.
Much more change was evident when we compared 
men and women who were unmarried and worked full 
time. Table 3 shows that in the 1970s, unmarried men 
who worked full time were more likely to be Democrats 
(69%) than comparable women (65.3%).  However, this 
was the last decade when such men were more likely to 
be Democrats than were women who were unmarried 
and worked full time. After the 1970s, unmarried 
women who worked full time remained predominantly 
Democratic. In the 1980s, 63.2% of unmarried women 
who worked full time claimed to be Democrats as were 
65.8% of such women in the 1990s, 67.6% in the 2000s, 
and 67.4% in the 2010s. In every decade, unmarried 
women who were working full time were substantially 
more likely to lean Democratic than married who were 
unmarried men did not work full time.  (See Table 3 in 
Appendix B.)
Although unmarried women who worked full time 
retained a high likelihood of leaning Democratic over 
the decades, unmarried men who worked full time 
became much less likely to do so. From the 1970s to 
the 1980s, there was an 18% decrease in the tendency of 
unmarried men who worked full time to say they leaned 
Democratic. In the 1970s, 69% of such men claimed to 
be Democrats. In the 1980s, that number plummeted 
to 51%.  In subsequent decades, the percentage of 
unmarried men who worked full time and claimed to 
be Democrats was static, remaining at just above 50% in 
every decade. (See Table 3 in Appendix B.) 
 A possible explanation for the gender gap in party 
affiliation is that the economic experiences of these 
males and females are so different.  Men who are 
unmarried and work fulltime are much more likely 
than comparable women to earn a decent income and 
to live a more financially stable lifestyle. Such men are 
more likely to align themselves with the party that 
tends to be associated with protections for the wealthy: 
The Republican Party. Divorced women, especially 
those with children, typically need more help from the 
government than do divorced men. 
We observed that unmarried men who worked 
fulltime, rather than comparable women, had political 
leanings that changed dramatically after the 1970s. This 
finding raises the question of whether the conventional 
explanations of “women entering the labor force” and 
“fewer women were married” for the political gender 
gap are completely adequate.  It seems that these 
explanations cannot do complete justice to the changing 
political attitudes of men. The data in Tables 4 and 5 
help to address this question. 
Table 4 in Appendix B shows the zero-order 
correlations between our measure of the political 
gender gap (the percentage of females claiming to 
lean Democratic minus the percentage of men doing 
so) over the 31 survey periods , with several variables, 
measured at those survey periods, theorized to affect 
change in the political gender gap.  The percentage of 
women working fulltime (r =.71) and percentage of 
women married (-.73) have very strong correlations 
with the gap and are in the directions predicted by 
the “women entering the labor force” and the “fewer 
women married” theses.  The “percentage of American 
workers in unions” has a slightly stronger correlation (r 
=-.75) than either of these two variables and suggests 
that men’s role in the creation of the gender gap may 
be crucial because men were much more likely to have 
belonged to unions than women.  Finally, though, it is 
the percentage of married men that has the strongest 
correlation (r =-.77) with the gap of all the variables 
we examined here. This correlation strengthens the 
argument that understanding changes in men’s lives 
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is very important if we want to fully understand the 
emergence and maintenance of the gender gap in 
political affiliation.  This finding is consistent with our 
previous speculation that remaining single or regaining 
singleness likely increases men’s average wealth, while 
it decreases women’s average wealth.  It follows that 
men, more than women, would express attachment to 
the Republican rather than the Democratic party. (See 
Table 4 in Appendix B.)
Table 5 in Appendix B presents a modest test of 
which of the variables listed in Table 4 explain the 
most variation in the rise of the gender gap in political 
affiliation when others are controlled.  Table 5 reports 
on a stepwise regression involving all of those variables. 
In the resulting model, two variables—the percentage 
of men married and the percentage of women working 
fulltime—make it into the equation.  A beta of -.53 
indicates that, as the percentage of men married 
decreased, the gender gap increased, even with the 
percentage of women working fulltime controlled.  And 
a beta of .32 indicates that as the percentage of women 
working fulltime increased, the gender gap increased 
as well, even with the percentage of men married 
controlled. Together these two variables explain 61% 
of the variance in the political gender gap over time 
(adjusted r square =.61).  (See Table 5 in Appendix B.)
One major equivocation needs to be emphasized 
here: There are high degrees of inter-correlation among 
all variables introduced in the model presented in Table 
5, so this table should not be seen as eliminating any 
of the theories that guided this analysis.   One message 
stands, however: If one wants to explain the emergence 
of, and variation in, the political gender gap over the 
last 50 years, one needs to take into account not only 
what has happened to make women’s political leanings 
independent of men’s, but also what has helped to make 
men’s political leanings independent of women’s.
CONCLUSION
Our findings show considerable support for the 
two mainstream explanations of the emergence and 
maintenance of a gender gap in political preference in 
the United States: 1) that it results from a combination 
of women’s increased labor force participation and 2) 
from women’s decreased likelihood of being married. 
In fact, when we compare the political preferences of 
married men and women who are not working full 
time in each decade since the 1970s, we find there is 
no statistically significant difference in political leaning 
between the genders for any of those decades, even using 
very large samples.  When we do the same comparison 
of unmarried men and women who are working full 
time, however, we find a significant and substantial gap 
during the 1980s-- a gap that widens in later decades. 
We suspect that this latter change has much to do with 
working women developing relationships with other 
women in the workplace, relationships that inspire 
feminist consciousness and goals (e.g., Inglehart & 
Norris 2000; Manza & Brooks 1998) and unmarried 
women seeing their fates being linked to those of other 
women (e.g., Stout, Kretchmer & Ruppaner 2017) and 
less tied to those of particular men, their husbands (e.g., 
Edlund & Pande 2002).  
Our analysis of the comparison involving unmarried 
men and women who are working full time, however, 
revealed that it was not women’s likelihood of claiming 
Democratic-Party leanings that changed the most over 
the decades.  It was men’s leanings.  In fact, while the 
percentage of unmarried women, working full time, 
who claimed Democratic affiliation hardly changed at all 
over time, similar men’s likelihood of doing so dropped 
considerably.  This observation led us to consider that 
the mainstream explanations for the gender gap in 
political party affiliation might have over-emphasized 
the importance of women’s growing independence and 
under-emphasized men’s changing political affiliation. 
We speculated that the decreased likelihood of men 
declaring a Democratic Party affiliation might be 
related to another notable trend in American society 
since 1970: the fact that workers, and particularly male 
workers, have become much less likely to have labor 
union affiliations than they did in previous decades. 
Using a correlation analysis involving 31 data points, we 
found tentative support for this outcome.  We theorize 
that men’s detachment from unions may have involved a 
similar detachment from the Democratic Party, thanks 
in large part to the strong support of unions for that 
party.
Finally, our stepwise regression involving men’s 
declining chances of being married showed that this 
variable, plus women’s increasing working status, were 
the only variables that survived the cut even when the 
variables of union membership and women’s chances of 
being married were included.  This slightly unexpected 
finding underscores the main point of this paper: 
that we may not completely understand the gender 
gap in political affiliation unless we take seriously the 
experiences of men as well as women.  Men’s declining 
chances of being married may mean that they have not 
only been less likely to share mutual concerns with one 
significant woman (a wife) who might have compelled 
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an interest in the Democratic Party.  Singleness may 
also mean that men have been able to retain a greater 
portion of their income and, consequently, have been 
more likely to turn to the party that most aims to 
protect high income earners and their property: The 
Republican Party.
There are some notable limitations to this study.  One 
limitation is that, while certain variables like women’s 
work status and men’s marital status may explain 
general trends in the political gender gap, they will 
never be enough to account for local variation in the 
gender gap.  Ever since polling on such issues has been 
done, men have tended to have more positive attitudes 
towards entering wars, and less positive attitudes 
towards legislation supporting safety nets, than women 
(e.g., Kenschaft & Clark 2016).  Thus, we find that the 
gender gap in political affiliation made short-term leaps 
in 1991, during the first Gulf War, and in 1996 and 2010, 
when the Welfare Reform Act and the Affordable Care 
Act, respectively, were at issue.  It is beyond the scope 
of this, and probably any social science, paper to offer a 
model that might predict such local variation.
Perhaps an even more significant limitation, however, 
is imposed by the small number of data points available 
to analyze and the high degree of inter-correlation that 
exists among key variables.  Thirty-one data points in 
a time series analysis means that the tests of models 
involving more than a small number of variables are 
impossible.  These tests are especially challenging 
when key variables are as highly inter-related as they 
are in our analysis.  Most obvious, for our purposes, is 
the necessarily high correlation of men’s and women’s 
chances of being married over time.  Clearly as one has 
decreased since 1970 the other has decreased as well. 
Consequently, we are suspicious of our finding that 
men’s chances might be more useful for the explanation 
of the emergence of the political gender gap than 
women’s.  That both variables are also highly correlated, 
over time, with America’s de-unionization, calls into 
question another suggested conclusion we made in 
this paper: The role played by de-unionization in the 
emergence of the gender gap in political affiliation.
Finally, we recognize that our analysis is plagued 
by questions of sampling and measurement error. 
The General Social Survey has generally aspired to, 
and achieved, what is known as a multistage cluster 
probability sample.  But when all critical independent 
variables are as similar in their strength of association 
with the dependent variable (all here were associated 
with the political gender gap at anywhere from .71 
for the percentage of women working fulltime to -.77 
for percentage of men married), then sampling or 
measurement errors in any of the variables can make a 
substantial difference in the findings.
Nonetheless, this paper raises an important question 
for future researchers to pursue: Is it almost as likely that 
what has happened to men accounts for the emergence 
and maintenance of the political gender gap as what has 
happened to women?  
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Appendix A
Figure 1. Percentage of Women and Men Working Full Time, 1972-2018
 
                              Source: General Social Survey, 2018
Figure 2. Percentage of Women and Men Reporting They were Married, 1972-2018
 
 
         Source: General Social Survey, 2018
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Source:  General Social Survey data, 1972-2018, via the CMS, Berkeley.
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Table 2. Gender and Political Party Identification by Decade, 1981-2018
                 % of Men           % of Women                 
  Who are      Who are                                                                   Significance
Decade Democrats    Democrats                   N        Gamma         Level
1981-1990    53.4         58.5  12,456          -.10  <.001
1991-2000    48.2         57.8  12,271          -.18  <.001
2001-2010    50.1         57.9  11,319           -.14  <.001
2011-2018    51.4         59.3   7,797            -.14  <.001
Source: General Social Survey data.  
Appendix B
Table 1. Gender and Political Party Identification, 1970-1980
    Males   Females
Democrat   62.8%   63.4%
    (3093)   (3538)
Republican   34.7%   34.6%
    (1707)   (1936)
Independent or Other  2.5%   2.0%
    (122)   (112)
    N=10,506            Gamma= -.01  p=.25
Source: General Social Survey data.
12 Lindsay Petit, Madison Mellor and Roger Clark
Table 3.  Gender and Political Party Affiliation for Sub-Samples of Respondents by Decade, 1970-2018
 Sub-Samples          % of Males % of Females         N           Gamma         Significance 
 of Respondents                                                                                                                      Level                 
 by Decade
     
1970-1980
Unmarried & 
Working Full-time       69.0       65.3       1200  .09  p=.02
Married & Not 
Working
Full time              62.6       60.9       3971  .04  p=.63
1981-1990
Unmarried &
Working Full time       51.0      63.2       2063 -.24  p<.001
Married & Not 
Working
Full time              57.9      59.5       3809  .07  p=.23
1991-2000
Unmarried &
Working Full time       51.5      65.8       2587 -.29  p<.001
 
Married & Not 
Working Full time       54.4      50.9       3098  .07  p=.12
2001-2010
Unmarried &
Working Full time       54.5      67.6       2319 -.25  p<.001
Married & Not 




Full time             55.5     67.4       1628 -.23  p<.001
Married & Not 
Working Full time      49.8     48.2       2090  .03  p=.87
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Table 4. Correlations of Political Gender Gap with Other Variables Over 31 Survey Periods
         Political Gender Gap (1)
Other Variables
Percentage of Women
Working Fulltime      .71***
Percentage of Women
Married      -.73***
Percentage of American
Workers in Unions     -.75***
Unemployment rate     -.31
Percentage of Men
Married      -.77***
Notes: *** indicates significance at .001 level; (1) Political gender gap = percentage of women reporting they lean 
Democratic minus percentage of men reporting they lean Democratic.
Table 5.   Stepwise Regression of the Political Gender Gap on the Percentage of 
Women Working Fulltime, the Percentage of Women Married, the Unemployment 
Rate, the Percentage of American Workers in Unions, the Percentage of Men 
Working Fulltime, and the Percentage of Men Married
Political Gender Gap (1)
Percentage of Men Married    -.53**
 
Percentage of Women 
Working Fulltime        .32*
N           31
Adjusted R square      .61
Notes: We excluded variables with .10 entry criterion: Percentage of Women Married, Unemployment Rate, Per-
centage of American Workers in Unions and Percentage of Men Working Fulltime; * indicates significance at .10 
level; **, at the .01 level.
